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McLaughlin, Brian (Ed.)

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

Table of Contents

Notes on Contributors
Introduction: Jonathan Cohen (University of California, San Diego)
Part I: Mental Content:
Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content?
1. Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions: Gabriel Segal (King´s College, London)
2. There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content: Sarah Sawyer (University of Nebraska-Lincoln)
Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access?
3. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent: Anthony Brueckner (University of California, Santa Barbara)
4. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent: Michael McKinsey (Wayne State University)
Is the Intentional Essentially Normative?
5. Normativism Defended: Ralph Wedgwood (University of Oxford)
6. Resisting Normativism in Psychology: Georges Rey (University of Maryland at College Park)
Is There Non-Conceptual Content?
7. The Revenge of the Given: Jerry Fodor (Rutgers University)
8. Are There Different Kinds of Content?: Richard G. Heck Jr (Brown University)
Part II: Physicalism:
Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable?
9. Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism: Louise Antony (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
10. The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism: Paul M. Churchland (University of California, San Diego).
Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists?
11. A Priori Physicalism: Frank Jackson (Australian National University)
12. On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism: Brian P. McLaughlin (Rutgers University)
Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation?
13. Causation and Mental Causation: Jaegwon Kim (Brown University)
14. Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough: Barry Loewer (Rutgers University)
Part III: The Place of Consciousness in Nature:
Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical?
15. Dualist Emergentism: Martine Nida-Rümelin (University of Fribourg, Switzerland)
16. Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness: David Braddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney)
Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical?
17. New Troubles for the Qualia Freak: Michael Tye (University of Texas at Austin)
18. A Case for Qualia: Sydney Shoemaker (Cornell University)
Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness?
19. All Consciousness Is Perceptual: Jesse Prinz (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
20. Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I): Christopher Peacocke (Columbia University)

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