Table of Contents

Notes on Contributors
Preface
Just How Modular Is The Mind?
1. The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind Peter Carruthers
2. Is the Mind Really Modular? Jesse Prinz
3. Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? Richard Samuels
How Much Knowledge Of Language Is Innate?
4. Irrational Nativist Exhuberance Geoff Pullum and Barbara Scholz
5. The Case for Linguistic Nativism Robert Matthews
6. On the Innateness of Language James A. McGilvray
Has cognitive science shown that human beings are cognitively bounded, or irrational?
7. Bounded and Rational Gerd Gigerenzer
8. Bounded Rationality and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue David Matheson
Are rules and representations necessary to explain systematicity?
9. Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules Terrence Horgan and John Tienson
10. Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist, and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective Bill Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen
Can consciousness and qualia be reduced?
11. Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced William Lycan
12. Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced Brie Gertler
Does cognitive science need external content at all?
13. Locating Meaning in the Mind (Where It Belongs) Ray Jackendoff
14. The Intentional Inexistence of Language Georges Rey
Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations?
15. Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? Kirk Ludwig
16. Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? A Case for the ´No´ Side Chris Viger Can mental states, knowledge in particular, be divided into a narrow component and a broad component?
17. Can Cognition be Factorised into Internal and External Components? Tim Williamson
18. The Internal and External Components of Cognition Ralph Wedgwood
Index